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THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING ACT OF 1978: FEDERAL
REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS IN THE UNITED
STATES*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has recently experienced a tremendous increase in
foreign banking activity.' In response to this increased activity, Congress
has been evaluating the regulatory role which the federal government
should take in order to accommodate this growth effectively. The Interna-
tional Banking Act of 1978 (IBA)l is the most recent congressional proposal
for federal regulation of foreign banks in the United States.3
The growth of foreign banks in the United States has been directly
related to the increased volume of foreign trade and investment in this
* The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Dean Rusk, Sibley
Professor of International Law at the University of Georgia School of Law for his support in
the development of this Note.
The number of foreign bank facilities in the United States has increased 101%, from 104
to 210, in the past five years, and during the same period foreign bank assets have experienced
an even greater growth of 172%, from $24 billion to $66 billion. This growth is measured from
January 1972 to April 1977. While this growth has been dramatic, it is relatively small when
compared to the United States banking involvement in foreign countries. International Bank-
ing Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 7325 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. 573 (1977) (statement of Robert Bloom) [hereinafter cited as Int'l
Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings]. See generally D'Arista, The Foreign Bank Invasion,
160 BANKER'S MAGAZINE 43 (1977); HousE COMM. ON BANKING, CURRENCY AND HOUSING, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS., COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS PREPARED FOR THE FINE STUDY, BK. II, PT. 4,
INTERNATIONAL BANKING 727 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL
BANKING].
I H.R. 10899, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 1602 (1978), [hereinafter cited as Int'l
Banking Act of 19781.
1 Previous proposals were made in 1975 (Foreign Bank Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 958
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Bank Act of 1975,
Senate Hearings]), in 1976 (International Banking Act of 1976: Hearings on H.R. 13876
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Int'l Banking Act of 1976,
Senate Hearings]), and in 1977 (Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1).
Testimony at the 1977 hearings resulted in extensive revisions to the original bill as presented
to the House. A revised bill incorporating the changes was issued in Committee Print on
October 13, 1977. SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISION, REGULATION AND INSUR-
ANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS.
INTERNATIONAL BANKING ACT OF 1977, H.R. 7325 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Comm. Print]. This Committee Print was introduced verbatim to the second session of the
95th Congress on February 9, 1978 as Int'l Banking Act of 1978, supra note 2. It is this
Committee Print, however, which this Note refers to as the International Banking Act of 1978
(IBA) and upon which the analysis in this Note is based.
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country,' attributable in part to the increasing attraction of foreign coun-
tries to the United States as an international market.' Furthermore, this
growth of foreign bank entry into the United States is part of a global trend
towards transnational banking which is expected to continue. In response
to the continued growth of foreign banks in the United States, Arthur
Burns, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), commented:
From the Board's standpoint, we are primarily concerned about the ab-
sence of national policy and regulatory framework in this increasingly
important area and its attendant ramifications for the formulation of
monetary policy, the development of a sound and competitive banking
system, and the coordination of policies with national monetary and regu-
latory authorities abroad.'
This Note examines the advantages and disadvantages of federal regu-
lation of foreign banking and analyzes the effectiveness of the regulatory
proposals made in the IBA. In addition, the present regulatory system will
be discussed in relation to its effect on foreign banks and their organiza-
tional structure.
II. THE UNITED STATES REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
A. Domestic Environment
Our "baffling banking system ' 7 involves multiple regulatory entities and
The development of foreign banking in the United States can be traced to substantial
foreign investment in the mid-nineteenth century. Canada and Japan were the first countries
to initiate foreign banking in the United States by opening facilities in California in the
1870's. Foreign banking then responded to the economic climate of the United States by
surging after World War I, plummeting during the Depression years, and reviving again after
World War II.
As international trade increased, foreign banks realized a need to establish American
facilities to handle related banking transactions. Likewise, certain American banks opened
branch offices in foreign countries. As these international transactions increased American
banks met increasing foreign resistance, based upon the complaint that United States author-
ities did not provide reciprocal opportunities for foreign banks wanting to establish branches
in the United States. In light of the threat of foreign retaliation against United States banks,
New York became the first state to enact more liberal banking laws. See generally Note,
Foreign Banking in the United States, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595 (1973).
The growth of foreign banks involves an increase in their number as well as their aggregate
assets. Those banks which establish themselves in the United States are usually the largest
in their own countries and rank among the largest in the world. The 99 foreign banks operat-
ing in the United States as of April 1977 included 65 of the 84 foreign banks which AMERICAN
BANKER listed as the 100 largest commercial banks in the world. Wiegold, Foreign Banks Here
Practice Lessons Learned at Home - from Americans, Aug. 8, 1977, at 13, col. 1.
' Professor Lees lists specific factors responsible for foreign banking expansion in the
United States and summarizes the advantages available to foreign banks as a result of their
United States presence. F. LEES, FOREIGN BANKING AND INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 17-
18 (1976).
1 Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 102-03 (Letter from Arthur
F. Burns to Ferdinand J. St. Germain (May 25, 1977)).
1 Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System (pts. 1&2), 52 VA. L. REV. 565, 771 (1966).
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complex interrelationships. The foreign bank entering the United States
banking system must be aware of the distinctions between state and fed-
eral laws, the varying applications of federal laws to different classes of
banks, and the division of federal regulatory authority among several agen-
cies.' Some of the more "baffling" aspects of the domestic regulatory sys-
tem are discussed below.
1. Bank Charters. All banks are chartered under either federal' or state
law."' It has been alleged that the application of federal and state banking
laws and regulations to the various types of commercial banks results in
differing competitive advantages and disadvantages in each category."
Since every state has the power to legislate rules and regulations for its
state-chartered banks, the restrictions placed on banks may vary signifi-
cantly from state to state. 2
All national banks are required to be members of the Federal Reserve
System, 3 and all member banks, both national and state, are automati-
cally covered by deposit insurance. 4 The Federal Deposit Insurance Act
contains provisions which apply to both national and state banks obtaining
federal deposit insurance. Member banks of the Federal Reserve System
are subject to additional restrictions imposed by the Federal Reserve Act"
and other federal laws.'" In addition, the national banks are governed
primarily by the provisions of the National Banking Act. 7
0Id.
Banks chartered under federal law are known as "national banks." Id. at 566.
" Hackley classifies banks chartered under state law into three categories: "state member
banks" are those state chartered banks which join theFederal Reserve System; "insured state
banks" are those state chartered banks which obtain federal deposit insurance but do not join
the Federal Reserve System; and "noninsured state banks" are those state chartered banks
which neither obtain federal deposit insurance nor join the Federal Reserve System. Id.
Id.
" Id. at 567. For a summary of state laws on foreign banking, see Foreign Bank Act of 1975,
Senate Hearings, note 3 supra, at 18.
IS The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are authorized to regulate mem-
ber banks, 12 U.S.C. § 221 et seq. (1970). The Federal Reserve Board determines general
monetary, credit and operating policies of the Federal Reserve Sytem. It also establishes
reserve requirements for member banks and regulates interest rates paid on savings deposits.
Wermer, Frej, and Madway, Redlining and Disinvestment: Causes, Consequences, and Pro-
posed Remedies, 10 CLEARING HOUSE REV. 501, 513 (1976).
" Hackley, supra note 7, at 566.
IS Pub. L. No. 63-43, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified, as amended, in various sections of 12
U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C. § 409 (1970)).
11 The federal laws affecting banking include: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act,
12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq. (1970); Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (1970);
Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. § 611 et seq. (1970); Foreign Banking Acts, 12 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1970);
Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 347a, 347b, 412 (1970); McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 332
(1970); National Bank Acts, 12 U.S.C. § 21 et seq. (1970): Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48
Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15 & 39 U.S.C.); Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614,
49 Stat. 684 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 12, 15, 39 & 49 U.S.C.).
,1 Ch. 343, 18 Stat. 123 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 18, 19, 28 & 31 U.S.C.).
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2. Federal Reserve Member Banks. The Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System regulates member banks. 8 Member banks must
maintain a certain percentage of their demand and time deposits on re-
serve with their Federal Reserve Bank.'9 These reserves provide for a safer
banking system, but earn no interest, thereby inhibiting the earning capac-
ity of the member bank's funds. Member banks may utilize the discount
window of the Federal Reserve as a temporary source of funds.'"
3. Federally Insured Banks. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC)," which establishes criteria for the insurance of bank depos-
its,2 functions primarily as an insurance agency, and has regulatory power
over non-member insured banks. 2 Among other things, the FDIC regulates
bank mergers," the establishment of branches,25 and the payment of inter-
est on deposits.
4. Bank Holding Companies. According to the Bank Holding Company
Act (BHCA), 27 a domestic or foreign entity must receive the approval of
the FRB before becoming a bank holding company.28 Thereafter, the bank
holding company is subject to complete supervision by the FRB" and must
receive its approval before acquiring direct or indirect ownership or control
of any company. 0 Once within the regulation of the BHCA, foreign bank
holding companies3' are prohibited from engaging in non-banking activi-
" Hackley, supra note 7, at 567.
" The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are authorized to define demand
and time deposits. 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1970). Crosse and Hempel describe required reserves as
those portions of a bank's deposits in the form of cash on hand, deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks, or demand balances due from specified banks which must be maintained at the
Federal Reserve Bank of its district H. CROSSE & G. HEMPEL, MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR
COMMERCIAL BANKS 132 (1973).
" The extension of credit to member banks and the process of borrowing from the Federal
Reserve Bank is referred to as using the discount window. P. NADLER, COMMERCIAL BANKING
IN THE ECONOMY 35-37 (1973).
21 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811 et seq. (1970). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was
established under authority of section 8 of the Banking Act of 1933 and section 101 of the
Banking Act of 1935 and provided a permanent plan of deposit insurance for the purpose of
achieving sound, effective, and uninterrupted operation of the banking system. [1950] U.
S. CODE CONG. Svc. 3765, 3766.
2 The FDIC was originally created under § 12B of the Federal Reserve Act. In 1950 these
provisions were withdrawn from the Federal Reserve Act and enacted, with further revisions,
in a separate Federal Deposit Insurance Act. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1970); Hackley, supra
note 7, at 577 n. 74.
23 Hackley, supra note 7, at 578.
* 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. V 1975).
* 12 U.S.C. § 1828(d) (1970).
2s 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (Supp. V 1975).
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1970).
2" 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a), (b) (1970).
21 12 C.F.R. § 225.3 (1977).
30 Id., see also Barnes, The Fine Edge of Prohibition: Interstate and Foreign Banking in
the United States, 93 BANKING L. J. 911, 922 (1976).
31 A foreign bank holding company "means a bank holding company, organized under the
[Vol. 8:145
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ties, and subject to strict merger requirements.2 Finally, multistate bank-
ing activities of foreign bank holding companies must be specifically au-
thorized by state laws. 31
5. Investment Banking. One of the purposes of the Banking Act of
193331 was to prohibit commercial banks from going into the investment
banking business.3 5 Section 21 of the Act, generally known as the Glass-
Steagall Act, 31 takes a three-pronged approach.3 7 First, it prohibits any
laws of a foreign country, more than half of whose consolidated assets are located, or consoli-
dated revenues derived, outside the United States." 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(1)(iii) (1977).
12 Edwards, Regulation of Foreign Banking in the United States: International Reciprocity
and Federal-State Conflicts, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 251-52 (1974). While these are not
the only restrictive aspects of the BHCA, Edwards cites these as particularly relevant to
foreign banks. Title 12, Chapter II of the Code of Federal Regulations states that "A foreign
bank holding company may: (i) Engage in direct activities of any kind outside the United
States; (ii) Engage in direct activities in the United States that are incidental to its activities
outside the United States; (iii) Own or control voting shares of any company that is not
engaged, directly or indirectly, in any activities in the United States except as shall be
incidental to the international or foreign business of such company; (iv) With the consent of
the [FRBI, own or control voting shares of any company principally engaged in the United
States in financing or facilitating transactions in international or foreign commerce; (v) Own
or control voting shares of any company, organized under the laws of a foreign country, that
is engaged, directly or indirectly, in any activities in the United States if (a) such company
is not a subsidiary of such bank holding company, (b) more than half of such company's
consolidated assets and revenues are located and derived outside the United States, and (c)
such company does not engage, directly or indirectly, in the business of underwriting, selling,
or distributing securities in the United States; and (vi) Own or control voting shares of any
company in a fiduciary capacity under circumstances which would entitle such shareholding
to an exemption under section 4(c)(4) of the [BHCA] if the shares were held or acquired by
a bank ...." 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2) (1977). A foreign bank holding company may apply
to the FRB for a determination that other activities meet the conditions for an exemption
under section 4(c)(9) of the BHCA. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (g)(3) (1977).
3 Only two states presently permit acquisition of a local bank by an out-of-state bank
holding company. Iowa prohibits out-of-state bank holding companies from acquiring Iowa
banks except those holding companies (only one) having controlling interest in Iowa banks
on January 1, 1971. IowA CODE ANN. § 524.1805 (West 1977). Thus, Northwest Bancorporation
can acquire local banks in Iowa. Iowa Independent Bankers v. Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System, 511 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Maine enacted legislation effective January
1, 1978, which authorizes acquisition of Maine banks by out-of-state holding companies
provided that reciprocal privileges are extended to Maine banks. 9-B ME. REv. STAT. ANN. §
1013 (1977). But see Edwards, supra note 32, at 252, for California and New York exceptions.
31 Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. chs. 2, 3, and 6).
" Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971). "The Glass-Steagall Act
reflected a determination that policies of competition, convenience, or expertise which might
otherwise support the entry of commercial banks into the investment banking business were
outweighed by the 'hazards' and 'financial dangers' that arise when commercial banks engage
in the activities proscribed by the act." Id. at 630. The Supreme Court in effect said that the
same hazards and abuses are present in 1970 and that the intent of the act is still alive. Id.
at 639.
" Section 21 of the Bunking Act of 1933 makes it unlawful to: (1) engage in the business
of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing securities at the same time as engaging in
the business of receiving deposits payable on demand; and (2) to engage in the business of
19781
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entity accepting deposits from simultaneously engaging in the securities
business.39 Secondly, it prohibits affiliation with organizations dealing in
securities." Thirdly, it prohibits interlocking directorates between member
banks and such organizations. 0 Since a United States branch or agency of
a foreign bank is not a "bank" for the purposes of these sections of the Act,
a foreign bank may have both a United States branch or agency and a
United States investment banking subsidiary, despite the prohibition
against its direct involvement in the securities business. 4'
6. International Interstate Banking (Edge Corporations).2 Edge Cor-
porations are banking subsidiaries organized under the Federal Reserve
Act 3 to conduct international banking and finance operations." They may
not engage in domestic banking. 5 Since Edge Corporations are federal
corporations and are not governed by state banking regulations they can
be formed in all 50 states.4 Furthermore, the Edge Corporation is not
defined as a "bank" under the BHCA;47 therefore, it is not subject to Glass-
Steagall restrictions on securities affiliates.48 These Edge Corporations can
also accept deposits incidental to its international transactions and in this
receiving deposits payable on demand unless such business is incorporated or authorized by
law to do so. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1)(2) (1970).
11 For a more complete discussion of the "Glass-Steagall Wall," see Lichtenstein, Foreign
Participation in United States Banking: Regulatory Myths and Realities, 15 B. C. INDUS. &
COMM. L. REv. 879, 891-94 (1974).
12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1970).
31 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1970).
12 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
" Lichtenstein, supra note 37, at 894.
' Agreement corporations can also be included under this heading, but must agree to
observe the same limitations and restrictions as those applicable to federally-chartered Edge
Act subsidiaries. Solomon, International Banking Competition and Cooperation, 20
ANTrrRUST BULL. 143, 144-45 (1975). Agreement corporations resulted from the state charter-
ing of such institutions prior to the Edge Act legislation. See Lemmonds, note 44 infra, at
15. See Leimone, Edge Act Corporations: An Added Dimension to Southeastern International
Banking, [1974] MONTHLY REV. 130 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta) for a comparison of
Agreement Corporations and Edge Corporations.
13 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-32 (1970).
" Lemmonds, Edge Corporation: A Microcosm of International Banking Trends, 59
MONTHLY REV. 15 (1973) (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond).
5 12 C.F.R. § 211.1(b)(2) (1977). Edge activities are restricted to operations clearly related
to international or foreign business.
JS Lemmonds, supra note 44, at 15.
' 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1970).
'" Lichtenstein, supra note 37, at 975. The BHCA provides that no bank holding company
shall retain ownership or control of a non-banking company unless authorized by the FRB.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1970). MacKenzie & MacKenzie state that since shares owned or con-
trolled by any bank holding company subsidiary are deemed to be controlled by the bank
holding company, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(g)(1970), the formation of an Edge Corporation by a
subsidiary is the act of a bank holding company. MacKenzie & MacKenzie, Penetration of
the United States Market by a Foreign Bank, 6 INT'L LAw. 876, 887-88 (1972).
[Vol. 8:145
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sense can compete with local banks.49
7. Domestic Interstate Banking. Multistate branching restrictions of
domestic banking operations are based on state legislation which prohibits
an out-of-state bank from conducting domestic banking business. 0 Na-
tional banks are also precluded under the McFadden Act 51 from crossing
state lines to engage in domestic banking business.52 Through the estab-
lishment of Edge Corporations, however, domestic banks can cross state
lines for certain purposes.
B. Organizational Options Available to Foreign Banks
The type of organizational form chosen by the foreign bank can affect
how it will be regulated by either state or federal authorities and will
determine the banking activities the foreign bank may pursue. The options
open to foreign banks are: (1) representative offices, (2) agencies, (3)
branches, 53 (4) banking subsidiaries, and (5) investment subsidiaries. 4 The
various powers, activities, and restrictions which distinguish the various
organizational forms are set out in Figure 1.
,1 Lichtenstein, supra note 37, at 901. Edge Corporations may engage in "such limited
business in the United States as is usual in financing international commerce, including
deposit facilities; loan, overdraft, advance acceptance, and other credit facilities; commercial
letters of credit; foreign collections; purchase and sale of foreign exchange; remittance of
funds abroad; purchase, sale, and custody of securities and acceptance for account of custom-
ers abroad; and foreign credit information." 12 C.F.R. § 211.7(a) (1977). Leimone indicates
that Edge Corporations can accept demand and time deposits but not savings deposits as long
as these deposits are in conjunction with their international business transactions. Leimone,
supra note 42, at 133.
w Lichtenstein, supra note 37, at 889. The states have not authorized sister-state bank
entry, much less entry by "foreigners."
51 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
" First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U. S. 122, 130 (1969). In discussing the Banking Act
of 1933, the Supreme Court noted that branch banking by national banks would be permissi-
ble only in those states the laws of which permit branch banking. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker,
385 U. S. 252, 259 (1966). Thus, Congress's intent is clearly to place national and state banks
on a basis of competitive equality. Id. at 261.
Restricting the deposit gathering offices of any one bank to geographic areas such as state
boundaries or the location of the initial office is a basic principle of United States banking
regulation. Even if one state authorizes banks chartered by it to open branch offices outside
of the state, reciprocal legislation in other states must be available before these branches can
be established. Lichtenstein, supra note 37, at 895.
0 Under New York law additional foreign bank branch activities include purchasing in-
stallment indebtedness, making secured advances repayable on demand to an amount not
less than five thousand dollars, engaging in the safe deposit business, exercising certain
limited fiduciary powers, and, if authorized by the Superintendent of Banks, operating a
personal loan department. Edwards, supra note 32, at 243.
"4 For a detailed discussion of the organizational forms, see J. ZwicK, FOREIGN BANKING IN
THE UNITED STATES, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMrTTEE, PAPER No. 9, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-16
(1966).






Organizational Characteristic Office Agency Branch sidiary iary
1. Disseminate information
about parent bank and pro-
mote good relations for
parent bank X X X X
2. Buy, sell, and collect bills of
exchange X X X X
3. Issue letters of credit X X X
4. Transmit money abroad--- X X X
5. Make Loans X X X X
6. Subject to lending limits.' X X X X
7. Maintain credit balances X X X
8. Receive local deposits5 7  X X
9. Exercise fiduciary powers X X
10. Presence conditional upon
reciprocal treatment by
foreign country5 N  X X X
11. Requires prior federal
approval under the BHCA X
12. Required to maintain
reserves X X
13. Constitutes a separate
legal entity X
14. Federal deposit insurance
required-,0 X X
15. Require American directors
and shareholders X
16. Perform trust activities X
17. Depend on deposit
expansion for growth X
18. Authorized to deal
in securities(;( X
19. Considered a "bank"
under BHCAGJ X
Except for Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington. Id. at 35.
The loan limit of agencies and branches is calculated on the basis of the capital position
1978 INT'L BANKING ACT
As indicated in Figure 1, agencies, branches, and investment companies
are not considered "banks" under the BHCA;62 therefore, they are not
eligible to receive federal deposit insurance. Additionally, investment com-
panies can avoid the restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act.6 3 Agencies and
branches have a greater loan capacity than subsidiaries."' Agencies cannot
accept deposits 5 and, therefore, fractional reserve requirements are not
applicable to them."
At present, 14 states plus Washington, D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico, and
the United States Virgin Islands have some form of foreign banking. Figure
2 below indicates the type of foreign banking conducted and the distribu-
of the parent bank. The loan limit of a subsidiary is determined by the subsidiary's capital
position; therefore, the subsidiary must generate substantial capital to allow it to make large
loans. Id. at 5-6.
"7 MacKenzie & MacKenzie state that an agency may not be forbidden from holding funds
deposited with its parent outside the state and repayable outside the state. Thus, a California
agency could issue its parent bank's certificates of deposit to non-California corporations as
long as the certificates are deliverable and repayable outside of California. MacKenzie &
MacKenzie, supra note 48, at 884.
11 A foreign banking corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country may be
licensed in New York to maintain branches and receive deposits "if under the laws of such
foreign country . . . a [New York] bank . . . may be authorized to maintain either a branch
or agency." N.Y. BANKING LAW § 202(a) (McKinney 1971).
A foreign banking corporation in Illinois may not conduct banking business unless "under
the laws of the country under which such foreign banking corporation was organized, [Illinois
banks] may be authorized to maintain a banking office which may engage in a general
banking business." ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 161/2, § 503 (Smith-Hurd 1977).
Georgia's International Bank Agency Act prevents the issuance of a license to a bank
chartered in any country which does not allow banks from the United States to operate in
that country. GA. CODE ANN. § 41A-3304(b) (rev. 1974).
" California law prohibits a foreign banking corporation from accepting deposits unless "it
has been approved for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance..." CAL. FIN. CODE
§ 1756.1 (West 1968). As a result of this restriction, foreign bank branches in California cannot
accept deposits because they are not eligible for FDIC insurance. The FDIC can only insure
the deposits of banks (12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1970)) which are defined as banking institutions
"incorporated under the laws of any State, any Territory of the United States, Puerto Rico,
Guam, American Samoa, or the Virgin Islands. . . 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (a) (Supp. V 1975).
Edwards states that because of their inability to accept deposits and because of the similarity
of their powers to New York agencies, California branches are often called "operating agen-
cies." Edwards, supra note 32, at 241, 243.
,* N.Y. BANKING LAW § 508 (McKinney 1971). New York investment companies also have
the power to establish branches under certain circumstances and to act as a depositary of
public money of the United States.
'1 Branches, agencies, and investment companies are not "banks" within the meaning of
section (2)(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1970). Branches are
not "organized under the laws of the United States," and neither agencies nor investment
companies "accept deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand."
Edwards, supra note 32, at 246 n. 47.
2 See note 61 supra.
0 Lichtenstein, supra note 37, at 975. See note 48 supra.
" See note 56 supra.
" Some agencies are allowed to accept foreign deposits. See note 59 supra.
" See note 53 supra, at 7.
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State or Affiliates Branches"' Agencies Offices
CALIFORNIA 27 47 20




HAWAII 2 1 1
ILLINOIS 8 21 20
MARYLAND 1
MASSACHUSETTS 4 1




PUERTO RICO 2 10 1
TEXAS 2 18
U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS 7
WASHINGTON 4 2
WISCONSIN 1
TOTAL 116 112 91 186
tion within each state, territory, or possession. The remaining 36 states
either expressly exclude foreign banks or do not mention them."7
III. PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKING
Any decision concerning federal regulation of foreign banking in the
United States includes an evaluation of several conflicting viewpoints and
interests. For example, the FRB is concerned about the grave implications
of the ability of foreign banks to erode the FRB's control of monetary
policy.0 United States banks are concerned that foreign banks enjoy an
unfair competitive advantage as a result of permissive federal regulation,"
while foreign banks are concerned about the discriminatory effect of the
" Delaware, Texas, and Vermont prohibit foreign bank branches. Connecticut, Maryland,
and New Jersey do not admit foreign bank offices in any form. The remaining states have
enacted no statutory provisions which specifically refer to the establishment of foreign banks.
Rolland, Compilation of Foreign Bank Activities in United States American Banks, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 8, 1977, at 190-93. Note that the column heading "Subsidiaries or Affiliates"
includes bank and investment company subsidiaries as shown in the "Bank Subsidiary" and
"Investment Company Subsidiary" columns in Figure 1 as well as the branch offices of
investment counselors and securities companies. But see Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House
Hearings, supra note 1, at 95, Table 21, which lists 9 states, the United States Virgin Islands,
and Puerto Rico as having some form of foreign banking.
,9 California branches are listed under agencies. See note 59 supra.
70 J. ZwicK, supra note 54, at 26. But see Robertson and Phillips, OptionalAffiliation With
the Federal Reserve Purposes is Consistent With Effective Monetary Policies, reprinted in
Foreign Bank Act of 1975, Senate Hearings supra note 3, at 393 (optional membership in
the Federal Reserve System is not a contributory factor to monetary policy weakness).
11 Hearings on the "Discussion Principles" of the Financial Institutions and the Nation's
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regulatory system.7 These and other conflicting concerns and interests are
summarized below to assist in an evaluation of the IBA.
A. Monetary Policy
The FRB utilizes its regulatory control over member banks as an instru-
ment in administering monetary policy.7 However, agencies, branches,
and state banks owned by foreign banks, which are not members of the
Federal Reserve System, are not subject to any federal monetary policy
promoted through member bank reserve requirements .7 Despite this ad-
vantageous position, it is contended that foreign banking institutions do
not currently present a threat to the effectiveness of United States domes-
tic policy. 5
B. Discrimination Against Foreign Banks
Foreign banks are not accorded equal treatment under United States
laws.71 For example, they are unable to obtain federal deposit insurance,
7
form Edge Corporations, 7 or exercise full banking powers in any of the 50
states.79 Foreign banks attempting to establish national banks or Edge
Corporations face restrictive citizenship requirements for directors and
Economy (FINE) Study Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regula-
tion and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st
and 2d Sess., pt. 3, 1794, 1796 (1975)(statement of Alexander McW. Wolfe, Jr.).
72 Edwards, supra note 32, at 240.
1 The FRB utilizes the discount rate and reserve requirements to exert monetary policy
influence on member banks. However, the major monetary policy tool is open market opera-
tions which do not have exclusive application to member banks. The purchase and sale of
government securities is an open market. Note, The Federal Reserve System ahd the Forma-
tion of Monetary Policy, 45 CiN. L. REv. 70, 73 (1976).
", State chartered banks and foreign bank agencies and branches may be subject to similar
reserve requirements under state laws. However, the funds allowed to be held as reserves
under state requirements are generally of an interest earning type and, therefore, state reserve
requirements are not considered to be as restrictive. Edwards, supra note 32, at 267. See
Klopstock, Foreign Banks in the United States: Scope and Growth of Operations, 55 MONTHLY
REV. 140, 147 (1973) (Federal Reserve Bank of New York). See also F. LEES, supra note 5, at
64-66 and Auerback, International Banking Institutions and the Understatement of the
Money Supply, 53 MONTHLY REV. 109-18 (1971) (Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
11 Compare F. LEES, supra note 5, at 105, with INTERNATIONAL. BANKING, supra note 1, at
736, 767-70, and Lucas, Jones, & Thurston, Federal Funds and Repurchase Agreements, 2
QUARTERLY REV. 33, 48 (Summer 1977) (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) which indicate
that foreign banking presence in the United States substantially effects short-term capital
flow and the balance-of-payments position.
7' Edwards, supra note 32, at 261-65.
Foreign branches (agencies and investment companies cannot receive deposits) are not
"banks" as defined by 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a) and, therefore, cannot apply for FDIC insurance
under 12 U.S.C. § 1815. Edwards, supra note 32, at 240-41; see note 59 supra.
7' F. LEES, supra note 5, at 108-9. See also note 80 infra.
7 As indicated in Figure 2, only a small number of states even allow foreign banking. See
note 68 supra. See also Gilbert, Foreign Banking in the United States, 15 S.A.I.S. REV. 20,
23 (1971).
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stockholders. ° In short, foreign banks do not receive the same treatment
that United States banks receive in foreign countries."
C. Unfair Competitive Advantages
Although United States banks claim that foreign banks are afforded
certain opportunities that work to the detriment of domestic banks, 2 it is
doubtful whether these competitive advantages have significantly affected
the banking industry. In the area of multistate international banking,
national banks have the advantage since foreign banks are restricted to the
number of states in which they are allowed to operate.13 Foreign banks can
transact international business only in those states which expressly author-
ize their presence. National banks, on the other hand, can engage in inter-
national banking in any state through an Edge Corporation. However,
foreign banks have the advantage in the area of multistate domestic bank-
ing business.8 4 Foreign banks can conduct domestic banking business in
any and all of those states authorizing their presence, while United States
banks cannot cross state lines to engage in domestic banking. Also, foreign
banks are allowed to have security affiliates, 5 while the Glass-Steagall Act
'* Every director of a national bank must be a citizen of the United States. 12 U.S.C. § 72
(1970). All directors of an Edge Corporation must likewise be citizens of the United States.
12 U.S.C. § 614 (1970). A majority of the shares of capital stock of any Edge Corporation shall
at all times be held or owned by citizens of the United States. 12 U.S.C. § 619 (1970).
Consequently, difficulties are encountered in obtaining suitable citizens to serve as directors,
and the home office cannot control the operation. J. ZWICK, supra note 54, at 5.
1I United States bank's foreign offices are generally permitted the same banking powers as
all other banks in that country. However, foreign banks entering, or attempting to enter, the
United States banking system are faced with different and generally more restrictive regula-
tions than United States banks, federal or state. The generally accepted meaning of reciproc-
ity is that foreign banks should be given the same banking powers and should be placed under
the same regulatory constraints as are American banks in the United States, although they
should not be permitted activities permissible in their homelands, but prohibited by the
United States banking laws. Edwards, supra note 32, at 257-61. See Foreign Bank Act of 1975,
Senate Hearings, note 3 supra, at 226-31 for a survey of foreign regulation of United States
banks.
1 American bankers allege unfair treatment because foreign banks are allowed securities
affiliates and because foreign banks are allowed to function on a multistate basis. Edwards,
supra note 32, at 262. Domestic banks also allege competitive disadvantages in the areas of
costs of funds, arbitrage, and reserve requirements. F. LEES, supra note 5, at 64.
3 F. LEES, supra note 5. See Figure 2, at note 68 supra.
F. LEs, supra note 5, at 108-09. This advantage is somewhat lessened by the restrictions
placed on these foreign banks. For example, Georgia only allows foreign banks to operate in
the agency form; Illinois only allows foreign banks to locate in the Chicago loop area; and
California, in effect, only allows bank branches to operate as agencies. Also note that gener-
ally foreign banks are only interested in locating in the principal banking centers and not in
establishing a nationwide branch system. Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra
note 1, at 648 (Swiss Bank's Policy Position on International Banking Act of 1976).
93 Since foreign bank agencies, branches, and investment companies are not considered
banks (see note 61 supra), foreign banks can have an operational presence in the United
States in one or more of these forms in addition to a security affiliate. However, the number
and effect of foreign bank security affiliates are alleged to be too insignificant to justify federal
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prohibits such investment opportunities for domestic banks."8
State and federal reserve requirements are generally similar in amount,
but different in form." Those assets required by the FRB to be held in
federal reserve banks produce no income and represent "frozen assets"
that contribute nothing to bank earnings. In contrast, state nonmember
banks can apply a wide list of assets to satisfy state reserve requirements
and can thereby generate income from the required reserves with routine
money management."8 While domestic banks may choose not to be mem-
ber banks should they decide that the restrictive measures outweigh the
advantages of membership, foreign bank agencies, branches, and invest-
ment companies have no such alternative since they may not become
member banks.89 Foreign banks are also not eligible for federal deposit
insurance. 0 While this may seem to offer a cost advantage,9" it also is a
disadvantage in that it restricts operating flexibility where state law allows
foreign banks to accept deposits. 2 Finally, foreign banks are in an excellent
position to engage in arbitrage operations between the principal money
and credit markets during times of "tight money." 3 Since arbitrage is
generally based on very small price discrepancies, such cost advantages
resulting from more favorable reserve requirements become very signifi-
cant in these transactions. 4
D. Regional Development Interests
Foreign banking has grown substantially in regional centers'5 as these
centers recognize the potential economic growth that can be derived from
legislation. Schneider, Legislation to Limit Foreign Banking Here Would Hurt, Not Help the
U.S., AM. BANKER, Aug. 8, 1977, at 62, col. 4. cf. Foreign Bank Regulation in the U.S.A.: The
Federal Reserve Proposals, 125 BANKER 47 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Bank
Regulation] which refers to three foreign owned and nine domestically owned investment
companies in New York.
11 In limiting the securities activities in which banks can participate, the Glass-Steagall
Act precluded high-risk, high-gain potential investments. Thus, while it ensured that the
banking industry remains a low risk industry, it also reduced the profit potential of banking
investments. Edwards, supra note 32, at 263.
'? See note 73 supra.
F. LEES, supra note 5, at 65.
" See note 61 supra.
90 See note 77 supra.
" The federal deposit insurance premium assessment is equivalent to approximately three
percent of pretax net income. F. LEES, supra note 5, at 65.
92 Branches in California can only accept deposits if they have FDIC insurance. See note
59 supra.
11 "Arbitrage" can be defined as the "simultaneous purchase and sale of the same or
equivalent security, commodity contract, insurance, or foreign exchange on the same or
different markets in order to profit from price discrepancies." WESTER'S TMRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DIcriONARY 110 (1968).
" F. LEES, supra note 5, at 66-71. See also Klopstock, note 74 supra, at 46-47. Less restric-
tive reserve requirements allow more funds for arbitrage operations.
" Rolland, Foreign Bank Presence Grows Substantially in New York, California and New
Regional Centers, AM. BANKER, Aug. 8, 1977, at 1, col. 1. See Leimone, The Spread of Interna-
1978]
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international trade and investment." Due to this correlation between for-
eign banking and economic growth, 7 restrictions placed upon foreign
banking operations will favor some regional areas over others."
E. International Considerations
The reciprocity provisions" of several state statutes may be inconsistent
with present United States treaty obligations. 00 This potential for conflict
between state legislation on foreign banking and the United States treaty
commitments indicates a need for federal participation in negotiations
with foreign banks.' °0 In addition, the discriminatory treatment afforded
foreigns banks in the United States could prompt retaliatory legislation by
foreign countries. Fear of foreign retaliation against restrictive United
States banking practices prompted the more liberal banking legislation in
the late 1950's.1 2 Such retaliation today would be devastating to the major
United States banks, since foreign banking operations have been a major
source of their income in recent years. 03
F. Jurisdictional Issues
Legislators are concerned with the jurisdictional problems related to
foreign banking. The directors of foreign banks are foreign citizens living
tional Banking: A Regional View, [1971] MoNTmv REv. 142 (Federal Reserve Bank of At-
lanta).
" Dempsey, Legal and Economic Incentives For Foreign Direct Investment in the South-
eastern United States, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 247, 250 (1976). See Baer, Expansion of
Miami Edge Act Corporations, [1977] EcONomIc REv. 112 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta);
Baer and Garlow, International Banking in the Sixth District, [1977] ECONOMIC REv. 127
(Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
1 Georgia Knocks at the World's Door, ATLANTA, Jan. 1974, at 57; Adcock, Atlanta's New
International Connection, Sou'rH, May/June 1977, at 50; McWolfe, Florida Gains Importance
as Major Foreign Banking Center, Am. BANKER, Oct. 17, 1977, at 10, col. 1.
a Schneider, supra note 85, at 141, col. 1. See also 122 CONG. REc. H7,949 (daily ed. July
29, 1976) (remarks by Rep. Rousselot and Rep. Tsongas).
g See note 58 supra.
,0 The United States is obligated under numerous treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation (FCNs) to conform to standards of national treatment. National treatment within
the context of the FCNs means to accord to companies of those countries signing the treaty
the same treatment accorded "to companies created or organized in other states, territories,
and possessions of the United States of America." Foreign Bank Act of 1975, Senate Hearings,
supra note 3, at 237 (Memorandum From Paul Boeker to Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United States (March 23, 1976)).
At the House Hearings of the International Banking Act of 1977 Paul H. Boeker testified
in favor of the bill. However, he indicated that certain sections of the bill may impinge upon
the United States obligations under the FCN treaties. Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House
Hearings, supra note 1, at 275-80. See also Lichtenstein, supra note 37, at 885-86.
101 Note, supra note 4, at 615.
"02 See note 4 supra.
103 Barnes, supra note 30, at 938-39. Unfair curbs on foreign banks may lead to retaliation
by foreign countries. Dowleng, Curbs on Foreign Banks Seen Leading to Retaliation, AM.
BANKER, July 14, 1977, at 1, col. 1. In response to congressional legislation to restrict foreign
banks to a single state, United States banks could be confined to one city or country within
the Common Market. Such a limitation would have a devastating impact on United States
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in a foreign country and may not be subject to United States jurisdiction.
Personnel of foreign banks can easily remain, or be transferred, outside
United States jurisdictional limits. Additionally, essential records may be
difficult, if not impossible, to reach if they are maintained in foreign coun-
tries. Finally, in the event of insolvency of a foreign bank's operation,
assets may not be subject to creditors' claims, nor may foreign depositors
be willing to subrogate their claims to United States regulatory agencies. 104
Thus, a regulatory scheme with neither in personam nor in rem jurisdiction
over the parties or the assets would be ineffective.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING ACT OF 1978
The International Banking Act of 1978 would provide federal regulation
of foreign bank participation in domestic financial markets. 5 The purpose
of this Act is to give foreign banking institutions the same rights, duties,
and privileges as domestic banks, while subjecting them to the same limi-
tations, restictions, and conditions. 00 This section examines the IBA in the
context of the problems highlighted in the previous section and evaluates
its effectiveness in accomplishing its stated purpose.
A. FRB Controls
The rapid growth of foreign banking institutions in the United States
resulted in the FRB's original proposal to federally regulate foreign
banks.tn The IBA proposes a comprehensive regulatory system to control
the foreign bank's impact on the nation's money and credit markets while
maintaining the principle of "nondiscrimination" or "national treat-
ment." 0
1. Defining the Foreign Bank
"Foreign bank" has been defined as encompassing all foreign banking
banking in Europe. Foreign Bank Regulation, supra note 85, at 57. Schneider states that
United States banks abroad are more vulnerable to restrictive legislation than foreign banks
in the United States with an estimated 125 United States banks having aggregate foreign
assets of over $150 billion. Schneider, supra note 85. See also Leimone, Foreign Branches Add
to Growth, [1973] MONTHLY Rav. 112 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta). Mr. Paul Fabre
stated that the practical effect of such restrictive legislation would be "to give free rein to
U.S. banks and securities firms to compete very strongly in Europe in all areas." Int'l Banking
Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 371.
"I Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 561-62 (statement of George
Le Maistre).
" Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 1.
'" Id. at 46.
07 122 CONG. REc. H7,936-7 (daily ed. July 20, 1976) (remarks by Rep. Moakley). See also
F. LEEs, supra note 5, at 113-15. The FRB has consistently maintained the position that
Congress should enact legislation which provides for the regulation and supervision of foreign
banks operating in the United States. More specifically, the FRB has recommended that
such litigation establish a national framework in which comparable foreign and domestic
banking institutions are governed by the same type of banking and monetary regulations.
Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 101 (Letter from Arthur F. Burns
to Ferdinand St. Germain (May 25, 1977)).
001 Foreign Bank Act of 1975, Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 46 (statement of George
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activities conducted in the United States.' The focus of the definition has
now shifted from actually engaging in banking activity to an institution's
"power" to engage in banking business,"' thus, eliminating the incentive
for organizing shell banking corporations abroad which do business solely
in the United States."' Literally construed, the proposed definition would
subject a foreign institution to IBA regulation where its activities are
"usual in connection with the business of banking" in its homeland, re-
gardless of what the scope of the usual business of banking is in the United
States."2
W. Mitchell). For a definition of national treatment, see note 100 supra.
,0 The term "foreign bank" has undergone several definitional changes since the original
FRB proposal. Foreign Bank Act of 1975, Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 280, § 18(a)(2).
Section 18(a)(2) of that proposal defined "foreign bank" in terms of being "principally en-
gaged in the banking business outside the United States." Id. The definition was revised to
"principally conducts its banking business outside the United States" in the International
Banking Act of 1976, Int'l Banking Act of 1976, Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 91, §
1(b)(7), and that definition was carried through to the initial proposal of the International
Banking Act of 1977, Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 4, § 1(b)(7).
However, the FRB has identified two main problems with that definition:
1) it excludes a foreign owned bank which principally conducts its business in this coun-
try, and
2) it is not clear whether the "principally conducts business" test is subject to a one-time
interpretation or is to be continuously updated.
At the time, the FRB recommended that authority be granted to the FRB or the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency to change the scope of the definition so as to prevent evasion of the Act.
Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 114 (statement of Stephen S.
Gardner). The Institute of Foreign Banks expressed no objection to the redefinition of the
term but opposed the discretionary sweep of the definition proposed by the FRB. Id. at 507
(statement of Institute of Foreign Bankers).
Another change in the scope of the definition has also been evident in the progression of
bills. While not in the original Foreign Bank Act of 1975, the phrase "subsidiary, as that term
is defined in the Bank Holding Company Act" was inserted into the definition of "foreign
bank" proposed in § 1(b)(7) of the Int'l Banking Act of 1976, Senate Hearings, supra note 3,
at 91. This phrase was continued in the initial proposal of the International Banking Act of
1977, but has been deleted in the latest Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 3, § 1(b)(7). This
deletion excluded from the definition of "foreign bank" any foreign subsidiary not "organized
under the laws of the United States, [or] any State of the United States . . . which (1)
accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages
in the business of making commercial loans." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1970). Although under
previous definitions New York's authorized investment companies could have avoided the
effect of this Act by refraining from accepting deposits and from the business of making
commercial loans, under the revised definition the IBA brings the New York investment
companies within its scope.
1o Compare Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 5, § 1(b)(7) with
Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 3, § 1(b)(7).
Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 115.
1,2 The exact phrasing of the bill states "engage in banking activities usual in connection
with the business of banking in the countries where such foreign institutions are organized
or operating." Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 3, § 1(b)(7). Note that while investment banking
is usual in connection with the business of banking in Europe, it is legislatively excluded from
the allowable scope of banking activities in the United States. See note 36 supra.
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2. Citizenship Requirements
The citizenship requirements for national banks 3 would be amended to
allow the Comptroller of the Currency in his discretion to allow "not more
than a minority of the total number of directors" to be foreign citizens.'
The citizenship requirements for Edge Corporations"' would also be
amended to delete the requirement that all directors shall be citizens of
the United States."' It also would allow 50% or more of the shares of capital
stock to be held by foreign interests, subject to FRB approval. 7 These
revisions would permit foreign banks to become member banks able to
form Edge Corporations in any state in the United States."8 Previous pro-
posals which granted the FRB discretionary powers to waive both the
reserve requirements for Edge Corporations' authorized deposits and the
limits on outstanding liabilities are omitted from the proposed IBA, in
accordance with the goal of national treatment of foreign banking institu-
tions.",
3. Federal Branches and Agencies
The IBA would authorize the incorporation of federal branches and
agencies subject to the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency. Thus,
for the first time, both branches and agencies would be treated in interna-
tional banking legislation. 2 " The IBA would establish a dual system of
foreign banks, distinguishing state branches, agencies, and commercial
lending companies from federal branches and agencies. The former would
,, 12 U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 4.
12 U.S.C. § 614 (1970).
, Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 5.
" Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 5-6.
As previously mentioned, foreign banks may not form Edge Corporations and therefore,
are restricted in the number of states in which they can operate. Lichtenstein has suggested
that problems of unfair competition could be resolved by offering the Edge Corporation option
to foreign banks on an exclusionary basis. That is, if the Edge Corporation option was chosen,
the foreign bank could not also utilize branches and subsidiaries on a multistate basis. These
provisions have followed this suggestion fairly closely. Lichtenstein, supra note 37, at 975.
According to Leimone, however, citizenship requirements for stockholders and directors do
not apply to Agreement Corporations which operate under state charters while submitting
to FRB regulation. This suggests the possibility that foreign banks can form Agreement
Corporations to engage in international banking activities. Leimone, supra note 42, at 132.
"I The initial proposal in § 3(b)-(c) of both the International Banking Act of 1977 and the
International Banking Act of 1976, provided that the Edge Corporation minimum reserve
requirements, which are the same as those for member banks, be eliminated with the ap-
proval of the FRB to insure competitive equality between branches and agencies of foreign
banks and Edge Corporations. Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at
116.
"1o Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 7, §§ 4-5. In the initial FRB proposal, the Foreign Bank
Act of 1975 only applied to foreign bank branches. Foreign Bank Act of 1975, Senate Hearings,
supra note 3, at 280, § 18. The scope of the proposed federal regulation was expanded in 1976
to include foreign branches and agencies. Int'l Banking Act of 1976, Senate Hearings, supra
note 3, at 95, § 4. The FRB in the hearings on the International Banking Act of 1977 recom-
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be subject to state regulatory authority, while the latter would be
"conducted with the same rights and privileges as a national bank at the
same location" and "subject to all the same duties, restrictions, penalties,
liabilities, conditions, and limitations that would apply to a national bank
doing business at the same location."'' Foreign banks seeking to establish
an initial presence in the United States would be allowed to establish a
federal branch or agency in any state in which the establishment of a
branch or agency is not prohibited by state law. Foreign banks with exist-
ing branches and agencies in only one state would have to determine
whether to convert all branches and agencies to federal branches and agen-
cies or retain their status as state branches and agencies.'22 Foreign banks
with existing branches and agencies in more than one state would have to
designate a home state and determine whether to convert branches and
mended that federal agencies not be subjected to the capital equivalency requirements since
they are precluded from receiving deposits. Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra
note 1, at 118 (statement of Stephen S. Gardner). The current IBA does not follow the FRB's
recommendation and failed to exclude federal agencies from capital equivalency require-
ments as had been done in the International Banking Act of 1976 and the initial proposal of
the International Banking Act of 1977.
"I Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 7, § 4. Two notable exceptions to national bank treatment
are that federal branches and agencies are not required to become member branches and that
federal agencies are not required to become federally insured banks.
This language, as it concerns the deposit acceptance capability of federal branches, may
be subject to two interpretations. First, it may mean that, since Edge Corporations are the
only means whereby a national bank can engage in interstate banking, federal branches would
be subject to the same rights, privileges, and restrictions as an Edge Corporation. Under this
interpretation, federal branches could only accept deposits incidental to international trans-
actions and could not accept domestic deposits. A broader interpretation, however, would
allow federal branches to exercise the same banking powers as a national bank whose home
office was located at that location. Such powers would include the acceptance of domestic
deposits and would place the federal branch in a position to compete for local deposits. The
IBA would check this power because section 4(a) provides that the state may prohibit the
establishment of a foreign bank branch, and section 5(a) provides that the state must ex-
pressly permit the establishment of a federal branch, Under this broader interpretation,
therefore, the state would still control the receipt of deposits from the general public.
The first interpretation would apply solely to the foreign bank choosing to operate a federal
branch outside its home state as provided for in section 5 of the IBA. The broader interpreta-
tion would apply solely to the foreign bank seeking to establish an initial presence in the
United States through a federal branch. These two interpretations could result in federal
branches having different deposit taking capabilities. Furthermore, those foreign banks not
currently established in the United States would be able to offer a broader range of services
which would penalize those foreign banks already present in the United States.
,12 The IBA prohibits a foreign bank from maintaining both a federal branch and agency
in the same state, Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 9, § 4(e), and both a federal branch or
agency and a state branch or agency in the same state. Id. at 7, § 4(a). A strict construction
of the IBA, therefore, mandates that a foreign bank wishing to maintain multiple branches
or agencies in a single state can only do so if they are all federal branches or all federal
agencies. As listed in Figure 2, New York is the only state to have both foreign bank branches
and foreign bank agencies. Although eight banks have more than one branch in the city, there
are no New York banks which have both branches and agencies in the state. Rolland, supra
note 68, at 190, col. 1. Under New York law, a foreign bank cannot operate both an agency
and a branch in New York. N.Y. BANKING LAws § 202(d) (McKinney 1971).
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agencies to federal branches and agencies or remain within the state regu-
latory system.'
The IBA would also require that assets be held in each state in which a
federal branch or agency is established. 4 The general purpose of this asset
requirement is to ensure that, in the event of insolvency, there will be
sufficient assets in the state to satisfy the claims of United States creditors
and depositors. i2
4. Reserve Requirements
The IBA would place federal branches and agencies under the same
reserve requirements as member banks, but would grant discretionary au-
thority to the FRB to waive the prescribed reserve requirements in order
to maintain vigorous and fair competition between member banks and
federal branches and agencies. 2 ' Federal branches and agencies would be
subjected to reserve requirements only if the total worldwide consolidated
bank assets of their parent bank were in excess of $1 billion.'21 Such a
requirement follows the recommendation of the FRB' = but is not in keep-
ing with the goal of national treatment of foreign banks. Previous proposals
pertaining to reserve requirements had included all foreign bank branches,
agencies, and -commercial lending companies, but foreign banking inter-
ests protested the discriminatory nature of such a proposal. 2
The IBA would also grant federal branches and agencies access to the
clearing, discount, and advance facilities of the Federal Reserve System
specifying that due regard be given to the federal branch or agency's ac-
count balances maintained as reserves.'1 Such discretionary authority can
operate to both discourage competitive inequality and to encourage foreign
bank participation and national treatment.
" See text at notes 76-81.
"u Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 11, § 4(g)(4).
12 Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 119.
' Comm. Print., supra note 2, at 34, § 7(a)(1).
' Id. at 35, § 7(a)(2). The Foreign Bank Act of 1975 established mandatory membership
in the Federal Reserve System if its parent bank had total worldwide bank assets of $500
million. Foreign Bank Act of 1975, Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 258, § 3(3). The Interna-
tional Banking Act of 1976 imposed a similar mandate except that the threshhold amount
for mandatory membership was raised to $1 billion. Int'l Banking Act of 1976, Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 106, § 7(a)(2).
" The FRB maintains that since the foreign banks in the United States have the same
characteristics as the large domestic United States banks, which are all federal reserve mem-
bers, the foreign banks should be members for reasons of equity (Letter from Stephen S.
Gardner to Dr. Wolfgang Jahn (June 2, 1977) reprinted in Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House
Hearings, supra note 1, at 135).
"2 The Institute of Foreign Bankers maintained that denying federal reserve membership
choice to foreign bank agencies and branches cannot be viewed abroad as anything but
discrimination unless the arbitrary size distinctions are applied to domestic banks as well as
to foreign banks. Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 481-94.
'3 Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 36, § 7(b).
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5. Monetary Policy
For a number of years the FRB has been attempting to include nonmem-
ber depository institutions within its reserve setting authority, claiming
that it needs such authority to perform its role in setting monetary policy
more efficiently. 3' Considerable comment and criticism have been di-
rected at the inappropriateness of such authority-extending attempts. No
similar mandatory membership or reserve requirements are imposed on
domestic banks.
32
B. Multistate Banking Operations
The IBA would offer a foreign bank three alternatives for operating
outside its "home state:' ' 33 (1) as a state branch, agency, or commercial
lending company, (2) as a federal branch or agency, or (3) as a bank
acquired under section 3 of the BHCA. If the foreign bank chose to operate
as a state branch, agency, or commercial lending company, it would have
to be "approved by the regulatory authority of the state in which. .. [it]
is to be operated.' '"3 This alternative would ensure minimum disruption
of existing foreign bank operations, since all foreign branches and agencies
currently operate under the auspices of state law. It would also obviate the
necessity of a grandfather clause, since foreign banks presently can have
state branches, agencies, and commercial lending companies in more than
"I Foreign Bank Act of 1975, Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 396-98 (statement of John
B. Olin).
,31 The New York Clearing House Association argues that since no similar mandatory
membership or reserve requirements are imposed on domestic banks it is difficult to support
the premise that such requirements are necessary to assure foreign bank compliance with
United States monetary policies. Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at
301 (statement of John F. Lee). The Conference of State Bank Supervisors also states that
the FRB has not demonstrated that optional affiliation with the system by our domestic
commercial banks has impeded the application of its monetary policy controls nor that
foreign banks operating in the United States have had a similar effect. Id. at 318 (statement
of William E. Whitesell).
According to § 5(b) of the IBA, the home state of foreign bank-
(1) which has no branch or subsidiary bank in the United States, but which has
an agency or commercial lending company in one or more States, is whichever of
such States is determined by election of the bank, or, in default of such election,
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
(2) which has a branch or subsidiary bank in one State only, is that State.
(3) which has a branch or subsidiary bank in more than one State, is whichever
of such State is determined by election of the bank, or, in default of such election,
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 16, § 5(b).
3I Previous drafts and proposals had prohibited foreign branching outside the home state
unless domestic banks could likewise branch. The Foreign Bank Act of 1975 made foreign
banks subject to the same intrastate branching restrictions as national banks, Foreign Bank
Act of 1975, Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 286, § 18(i), and prohibited the acquisition of
additional banks located outside the state. Id. at 258, § 3(2). The International Banking Act
of 1976 prohibited interstate operations by federal or state branches unless a national bank
was entitled to the same branching privileges. Int'l Banking Act of 1976, Senate Hearings,
supra note 3, at 101, § 5(a). The International Banking Act of 1977 as introduced to the House
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one state, subject to state regulation.'3
If a foreign bank chose to operate a federal branch or agency, it would
have to be "expressly permitted by the state in which it is to be oper-
ated." 131 In operating a federal branch or agency across state lines, a foreign
bank would be subject to restrictions similar to those imposed upon a
national bank,'3 which is prohibited from crossing state lines, 38 except in
the form of an Edge Corporation. However, while a national bank can
establish an Edge Corporation without the approval of banking authorities
in the state in which it is to be operated, the IBA would require foreign
banks to obtain express permission from the state in which it plans to
operate a federal branch or agency. 39 Such a requirement is inconsistent
with the goal of national treatment of foreign banks. 40
Finally, if a foreign bank chose to acquire a bank under section 3 of the
BHCA, it would have to be a "bank holding company the operation of
whose banking subsidiaries were principally conducted in the foreign
bank's home state."'' The FRB must approve and the state statutes must
specifically authorize such an accquisition"I Since only two states' allow
such acquisitions, this restriction is tantamount to prohibition.' An addi-
of Representatives had the same restriction on interstate banking as the International Bank-
ing Act of 1976, Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 14, § 5(a).
"I Foreign Bank Act of 1975, Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 253, § 3, Int'l Banking Act
of 1976, Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 101, § 5(a)-(b), and Int'l Banking Act of 1977,
House Hearings, supra note 1, at 14, § 5(a)-(b). Each included a statement that prohibited
multistate operation of foreign branches or agencies that did not comply with the provisions
of the specific act and that were not established prior to a specified date. The intent of these
grandfather clauses was to avoid unfairly causing existing foreign banking branches and
agencies to close after they had been legally established in good faith under existing laws.
The IBA obviates the necessity for a grandfather clause in multistate operations by allowing
foreign banks to continue to maintain their state branches, agencies, and commercial lending
companies in more than one state, subject to state regulation.
'e Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 15, § 5(a)(2).
13 See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
" National banks can establish branches only where state law would authorize state banks
to establish branches. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970). See note 33 supra.
'' State regulatory authorities may, therefore, expressly deny permission to federal
branches and agencies even though that state allows the formation of state foreign bank
branches and agencies. The reason for this difference lies in the type of banking business in
which the foreign bank may engage. State branches and agencies may generally compete in
both domestic and international banking business while the federal branch or agency may
only compete in international banking business. Thus, a state wishing to avoid foreign bank-
ing competition in its domestic market may only allow federal branch or agency operations.
" Since the Institute of Foreign Bankers maintains that it is a fundamental principle of
its interstate branching practice not to enter a state that does not want foreign banking
presence, the effect of such restriction should not be severe. Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House
Hearings, supra note 1, at 509-10 (statement of the Institute of Foreign Bankers).
"' Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 15, § 5(a)(3).
14 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1970).
" See note 33 supra.
'" At least this restriction gives interested states the option to amend their statutes so as
to allow such interstate acquisitions rather than federally legislating a matter considered to
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tional consideration of the multistate branching provisions is that a foreign
bank would be allowed to acquire a subsidiary bank only if the operations
of the acquiring bank holding company's subsidiaries were "principally
conducted" in the foreign bank's home state. 45
This selection of alternatives presents an interesting problem. If the
foreign bank chose to remain within the state regulatory system, then no
change would occur, since under present law it cannot operate in the state
without the approval of the state regulatory authority. If, however, the
foreign bank chose to convert to federal branches or agencies, a conflict
could occur. Since a federal branch or agency would have to be "expressly
permitted by the State in which it is to be operated,"' 46 the state might be
able to prevent the foreign bank from converting to, or even forming, a
federal branch or agency simply by refusing to expressly permit its opera-
tion. This dilemma might be avoided by inferring permission from state
statutes authorizing existing foreign branch or agency activity, even
though the states might legislatively deny such an inference by requiring
express permission. In either case each state would have direct authority
to approve the operation of a federal branch or agency in that state. This
situation differs from Edge Corporations, which require approval only from
federal authorities.
Several prohibitions may prevent a foreign bank from converting to
federal branches. A foreign bank would not be able to establish a federal
branch or agency in any state in which it were operating a branch or agency
pursuant to state law.'47 In addition, no foreign bank would be able to
maintain both a federal branch and a federal agency in the same state."8
For example, in New York, which is the only state having both foreign
branches and foreign agencies,"' three banks have more than one branch,10
and no New York bank has both a branch and an agency. 5' Therefore, a
foreign bank operating more than one branch or agency in New York would
have to convert them to either federal branches or agencies if it chose that
alternative.
C. Federal Deposit Insurance
The effectiveness of the FDIC in protecting the financial stability of
insured banks stems not only from a system of insuring deposits but also
be a state's prerogative. Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 586
(statement of Robert Bloom).
"I The term "principally conducted" is subject to the same criticism the FRB made of this
wording when used to define "foreign bank." See text at note 109 supra.
46 Id. at 15, § 5(a)(2).
" d. at 7, § 4(a).
"' Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 9, § 4(e).
See Figure 2, at note 68 supra.
"0 Barclays Group, Standard and Chartered Banking Group Limited, and Swiss Bank
Corporation each have two branches in New York. Int'l Banking Act of 1976, Senate Hearings,
supra note 3, at 180-82 (statement of John B. Olin). See note 122 supra.
"I Under New York Law, a foreign bank cannot operate both an agency and a branch in
New York. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 202(d) (McKinney 1971).
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from regulatory restrictions designed to lower the risk of bankruptcy.'1 2
Unlike previous proposals,'53 which dealt only with the aspect of depository
insurance, the IBA seeks to bring foreign bank branches fully within the
regulatory jurisdiction of the FDIC.'54 The major consideration for such an
effort is that such jurisdiction cannot be extended to the foreign bank's
activities abroad but must be applied to the foreign bank's branches in the
United States.
5
The IBA would make federal deposit insurance mandatory for foreign
bank branches and thereby provide regulatory control by the FDIC.'5 For-
eign banking interests maintain that this requirement would discriminate
against them in favor of other banks operating in the United States.'
The IBA would define "insured deposits" so as to exclude from coverage
foreign bank branch deposits not payable in the United States and deposits
meeting the criteria prescribed by the FDIC. 5 8 No such distinction would
"I' These regulations include capital requirements, liquidity requirements, loan standards,
reporting procedures, and entry restrictions. Edwards, supra note 32, at 266.
" The Foreign Bank Act of 1975 provided that within 90 days of its enactment the FDIC
was to submit to Congress a proposal for amending the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to
include within the coverage of such act, branches and agencies of foreign banks. Foreign Bank
Act of 1975, Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 279, § 17. The International Banking Act of
1976 deleted foreign bank agencies from consideration and specified that a branch accepting
deposits must maintain a surety bond or a pledge of assets with the FDIC. Int'l Banking Act
of 1976, Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 104, § 6. This wording was carried over to the initial
proposal of the International Banking Act of 1977 without change. Int'l Banking Act of 1977,
House Hearings, supra note 1, at 17, § 6.
Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 18, § 6(b).
"' Edwards, supra note 32, at 266.
Existing branches are allowed a one year grace period to become insured banks. Comm.
Print, supra note 2, at 18, § 6(b).
"' The European Economic Committee's Banking Federation considers this requirement
to be discriminatory, since FDIC insurance is optional for the majority of American banks.
Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 348 (statement of European
Economic Community Banking Federation). The Institute of Foreign Bankers submitted
testimony that federal deposit insurance is not necessary for foreign banks since they do not
engage in a significant amount of domestic retail banking business. Id. at 517 (statement of
Institute of Foreign Bankers). This contention, however, is somewhat misleading. Since 43
states require federal deposit insurance for state chartered banks (New York specifically
exempts foreign banks) and less than 1% all banks in the United States are not insured, the
practical effect of this requirement is equitable. Interview with Jane D'Arista, Staff, House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, (Mar. 17, 1978).
... The IBA would revise 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m) (Supp. V 1975) to specify that foreign bank
branch deposits are insurable if they were
Payable in the United States to-(i) an individual who is a citizen or resident of
the United States, (ii) a partnership, corporation, trust, or other legally cognizable
entity created under the laws of the United States or any State and having its
principle place of business within the United States or any State, or (iii) an individ-
ual, partnership, corporation, trust or other legally cognizable entity which is deter-
mined by the Board [FDIC] in accordance with its regulation to have such busi-
ness or financial relationships in the United States as to make the insurance of such
deposit consistent with the purposes of this Act . . ..
Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 19, § 6(c)(4). The FDIC is also granted discretion to establish
additional criteria as necessary or appropriate to maintain the viability of the Act.
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be made for domestic insured banks. 5 ' The definition of "insured
branch"'' 0 in the IBA differs from the definition of "insured bank"'' under
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act in that the IBA would consider a foreign
bank branch to be an insured branch when "any deposits" were insured,
whereas the Federal Deposit Insurance Act requires that all deposits be
insured to obtain this classification. 162
The IBA would require a surety bond or pledge of assets "to provide
protection to the deposit insurance fund against the risks . . . of a foreign
bank whose activities, assets, and personnel are in large part outside the
jurisdiction of the United States."'63 The FDIC stated that to require a
security bond or pledge of assets as the sole guarantee of deposit liability
is both onerous and impractical,'64 especially in light of the other regulatory
restrictions placed on insured banks. The FDIC proposed a more equitable
solution that would utilize a modified form of the surety bond and pledge
of assets to compensate for the additional' 15 risks to which the FDIC would
be subjected.'6 6 It is not clear whether or not the intent of the IBA is to
comply with the FDIC proposal which more closely adheres to the goal of
national treatment of foreign banks.'67 If not, this provision would be dis-
criminatory since it would not be applied to domestic insured banks. Fur-
thermore, under the IBA, the FDIC would retain the right to exercise its
judgment in imposing additional requirements of larger bonds and more
assets "without notice or opportunity for hearing."'6 If the foreign bank
failed to comply, the FDIC would be given authority to apply for injunction
against any branch of that bank within the jurisdiction of United States
12 U.S.C. § 1813(m) (Supp. V 1975).
"' "The term 'insured branch' means a branch of a foreign bank any deposits in which are
insured in accordance with the provisions of this Act." Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 21, §
6(c)(6).
"I' "The term 'insured bank' means any bank the deposits of which are insured in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Chapter [the FDIC]." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) (1970).
" The IBA definition could also be interpreted to include all deposits but no clarification
is offered in the bill. A further explanation could be that the wording was an attempt to
recognize that not all deposits in a foreign bank branch could be insured.
"' Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 21, § 6(c)(7).
Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 564 (statement of George
A. LeMaistre).
" The risks involved in international operations are both greater than and different from
the risks with which banks are normally familiar. Reimpell, International Lending Holds
Extra Risks Which Could Be Made Less Hazardous, AM. BANKER, Oct. 19, 1977, at 26, col. 1.
But see Ruckdeschel, Risk in Foreign and Domestic Lending Activities of U.S. Banks, 10
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 50 (1975).
'" This modified form of surety bond and pledge of assets is combined with the regular
deposit insurance coverage of domestic insured banks and would put foreign banks as nearly
as possible on an equal basis. Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at
565-66.
"07 If this is the intent of the IBA, then for clarification the word "additional" should be
inserted before the word "risk" so that the statement of purpose would read as follows "to
provide protection to the deposit insurance fund against the additional risks entailed .
(emphasis added).
,19 Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 27, § 6(c)(7).
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courts ' to have the necessary assets delivered to the FDIC. The IBA would
also grant discretionary authority to the FDIC to adjust the assessments
of insured branches "to provide equitable treatment for domestic and for-
eign banks."'70
Additionally, the IBA would give the FDIC a right to a cause of action
against "a foreign bank or any officer, director, employee, or agent thereof"'
for acts or practices outside the United States by simply alleging a belief
that "such act or practice . . . is likely to be a cause of or carried on in
connection with or in furtherance of"' activities which are unsafe or un-
sound and jeopardize the insurance risk assumed by the FDIC.'7"The pen-
alty for such practice would be the termination of the insured status of the
foreign bank or branch.'72
Venue and jurisdiction would be provided at the situs of the branch or
bank affected.' The IBA would also provide the FDIC with power to take
action to reopen or avert the closing of an insured branch of a foreign
bank.'74 Another provision would provide that merger transactions involv-
ing a foreign bank are excluded from the regulatory authority of the FDIC
"if no party to the transaction is principally engaged in business in the
United States.'17 5 This wording is also used to exclude dealings between a
foreign bank having an insured branch and any affiliate thereof. "' As pre-
viously mentioned, however, the exact meaning of "principally engaged"
has not yet been determined.'7 7
Thus, the IBA proposes to extensively revise the current Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, making foreign bank branches eligible for federal deposit
insurance. However, the numerous restrictions imposed on foreign bank
branches do not achieve the goal of nondiscriminatory or national treat-
ment; nevertheless, they may provide an insurance structure which would
be as equitable as possible considering the additional risks and jurisdic-
tional conflicts inherent in the regulation of foreign banks.
"' Id. In evaluating the discriminatory nature of such treatment, the nature of the risks
involved must also be considered. The risks associated with international financing are in part
a function of the economic and political environment of the foreign country(s) involved and
can generally be said to increase with geographic distance. An additional risk is that resulting
from fluctuations in exchange rates. Where such factors can greatly increase the risk to any
financial venture, it is reasonable to provide the FDIC with some discretionary authority so
as to adjust their exposure to this risk. Reimpell, supra note 165.
,70 Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 26, § 6(c)(11).
" Id. § 6(c)(15).
,' The FDIC can protect its assumed risk, therefore, without having to seek punishment
or judgment against a person or entity outside the court's jurisdiction.
"' Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 28, § 6(c)(15).
I7 ld. at 31, § 6(c)(25).
,7 Id. at 32, § 6(c)(26).
,' Id. § 6(c)(29).
'" See note 109 supra.
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D. Non-Banking Activities
Under section 8, the IBA would attempt to bring foreign banks' non-
banking activities within the regulation of the BHCA of 1956, as amended
in 1970:178
Any foreign bank that maintains a branch or agency [inclusive of federal
branches and agencies] in a State, any foreign bank or foreign company
controlling a foreign bank that controls a commercial lending company
organized under State law, and any company of which any foreign bank
or company [referred to above] is a subsidiary shall be subject to the
provisions of the BHCA. "9
According to the European Economic Community Banking Federa-
tion, 8 0 section 8 of the IBA would effectively preclude certain foreign banks
or non-banking firms from establishing or maintaining their presence in
the United States.'" The drastic effect of this provision stems from the fact
that the European approach to banking is so markedly different from that
of the United States.'82 Congress has previously recognized this radically
divergent view of foreign banking structures in its discussion of and
amendments to the BHCA. a8 Allowing these foreign bank activities, to
some extent, however, would negate the purpose behind the BHCA.14
'?- 12 U.S.C. § 1841-50 (1970). See Lichtenstein, supra note 37, at 917-43, for a detailed
discussion of foreign bank regulation under the Bank Holding Company Act.
,' Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 40, § 8(a). This is almost identical to the provision of
the Int'l Banking Act of 1976, Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 110, § 8(a), and is the exact
wording of the initial draft of the Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at
23, § 8(a). However, the approach of the original FRB proposal, Foreign Bank Act of 1975,
was completely different. It would have made any foreign bank exercising control over a
branch or agency of the foreign bank, which was established and operating under the laws of
the United States, a holding company. Foreign Bank Act of 1975, Senate Hearings, supra note
3, at 253, § 2.
'I" The European Economic Community Banking Federation represents the bankers asso-
ciations of each of the nine member-countries of the European Common Market.
'1' Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 352 (statement of European
Economic Community Banking Federation). The BHCA prohibits bank holding companies
from engaging in nonbanking activities. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1970). The EEC Banking Federa-
tion's interpretation stems from this proscription. Thus, according to the EEC Banking
Federation a foreign bank, which retains ownership in United States subsidiaries, engaged
in nonbanking activities cannot establish a banking presence in the United States, even if
the nonbanking subsidiary in the United States is owned by the holding company which
controls the foreign bank. Likewise, where a foreign bank controls a nonbanking firm which
has subsidiaries in the United States, that foreign bank cannot establish or maintain a
banking presence in the United States.
82 F. LEES, supra note 5, at 80. See also Lichtenstein, supra note 37, at 917-43.
' Lichtenstein, supra note 37, at 917-43.
'" The purpose of the Bank Holding Company Act was to provide adequate safeguards
against undue concentration of control of banking activities. Because of the importance of
the banking system to the national economy, the dangers accompanying monopoly in this
field are particularly undesirable in view of the significant part played by banking in our
present national economy. [1956] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2482.
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Therefore, attempts to regulate the banking industry would have to con-
sider this dilemma and balance the goals of national treatment against the
stability of the United States banking system and national economy.
The IBA has taken the approach recommended by the FRB, 5 which
would amend the BHCA5 6 to allow foreign bank holding companies to
retain and acquire non-banking companies principally engaged in business
outside the United States.'87 Three exceptions would be made to this statu-
tory exemption: (1) the foreign holding company may not engage in securi-
ties activities in the United States which would not be allowed if it were a
United States holding company, 8 1 (2) the exemption may not be used to
avoid the restrictions of section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA,11 and (3) affiliates
may not be offered more favorable credit terms than other borrowers. 90 A
further amendment to this provision explicitly states that for purposes of
the BHCA a bank holding company would be "principally engaged" in
business in the United States if its principal banking subsidiary were in
the United States.' According to the FRB, the general purpose of this
provision would be to ensure that the United States banking approach
would not be forced on foreign banking operations which are primarily
outside the United States.'
Also included within the non-banking restrictions of the IBA would be
the foreign bank's securities activities in the United States. The same
international conflict of banking approaches is also applicable to securities
activities, but in this area the United States regulatory attitude is not as
amenable to exceptions as in the area of other non-banking activities. In
" The FRB made the same recommendation in testimony at the hearings on both the
International Banking Act of 1976 (Int'l Banking Act of 1976, Senate Hearings, supra note 3,
at 38-41), and the International Banking Act of 1977 (Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House
Hearings, supra note 1, at 129-32).
12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1970).
", Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 131. (statement of Stephen
S. Gardner).
I" This exception prevents foreign holding companies from avoiding the restrictions of the
Glass-Steagall Act. Id.
"I Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act is codified in 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)
(1970). Id.
I" This exception prevents foreign banks' United States affiliates from having an unfair
competitive advantage over the United States' competitors. Id. The Institute of Foreign
Bankers maintains that this principle is followed in practice, but protests that the adminis-
trative burden of monitoring comparable credit terms is impracticable and too great for the
FRB. Id. at 505 (statement of Institute of Foreign Bankers).
"I Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 44, § 8(e). "This prevents large United States banking
organizations from ever being able to use the exemption." Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House
Hearings, supra note 1, at 132 (statement of Stephen S. Gardner).
Y' Since any companies principally engaged in business within the United States are
included within the requirements of the BHCA, foreign banks or their affiliates operating
principally in the United States are prevented from any significant competitive advantages
and those foreign banks wishing only to establish minimal United States operations are not
discouraged from doing so. Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 132.
19781
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
fact, the Institute of Foreign Bankers maintains that section 8 seems pri-
marily derived from concerns that the Glass-Steagall Act does not prevent
foreign banks from having both banking and securities affiliates in the
United States.' Foreign banks' opposition to this particular regulatory
restraint seems to be more vigorous than to any other provision of the
IBA."41 Again, this opposition stems from the differences in the two sys-
tems, since many European banks derive a considerable share of their
business from securities, trading, underwriting, and portfolio manage-
ment. 1" 5 In European countries securities activities are an inherent func-
tion of commercial banking activities.'"6 Despite the difference in banking
approaches and despite the possible dissolution of foreign owned securities
firms, the IBA restrictions would not prevent those affected foreign banks
from continuing to provide the same service to their customers. Indeed,
loss of service to their customers seems to be the major reason for their
opposition to the restraint on securities activities."7 The IBA would only
preclude operating directly in the market. The broker option is still avail-
able and can be continued in the same volume with the same exchanges
with which they deal at present. Thus, the service could still be provided
to their customers. This restriction does not seem as violative of national
treatment as the foreign bankers claim because domestic banks are pre-
cluded from such activities as well, and the foreign banks have alternative
means for providing the same service.
Non-banking activities (except securities activities) which were com-
menced or acquired prior to December 3, 1974"'1 would be allowed to con-
tinue their current activities indefinitely."' Non-banking activities ac-
quired after that date would have to be divested by December 31, 1985.
I" lnt'l Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 520. (statement of Institute
of Foreign Bankers).
"I Miller, Foreign Banking in the United States: Growth Sparks Legislative Controversy,
EUROPEAN COMMuNrrY, Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 11, 14.
", F. LES, supra note 5, at 80.
, Such a restriction would cause foreign bank owned securities affiliates to close and
preclude European banks from doing business in the United States securities markets. Int'l
Banking Act of 1977, House Hearings, supra note 1, at 344 (statement of European Economic
Community Banking Federation).
"7 The European Economic Community Banking Federation maintains that their securi-
ties issues are tailored for the United States market and are not marketable in Europe.
Furthermore, they maintain that the United States secondary market is essential to place
such issues. Id. at 345 (statement of European Economic Community Banking Federation).
"I This was the date of the grandfather clause as originally proposed in the hearings before
the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and which has been carried forward throughout
all subsequent proposals. Foreign Bank Act of 1975, Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 253,
§ 2.
I" The FRB may terminate such grandfathered activities if it finds "that such action is
necessary to prevent undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, con-
flicts of interest, or unsound banking practices in the United States." Comm. Print, supra
note 2, at 41, § 8(c).
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However, different grandfather rules would apply for the securities activi-
ties of foreign banks. All securities activities would have to be divested by
December 31, 1985, the grandfather date. A foreign bank's securities' affili-
ates would be permitted, however, to continue to engage in the business
"of underwriting, distributing, or otherwise buying or selling stocks, bonds
and other securities in the United States . . to the extent not prohibited
for national banks by . . .12 U.S.C. § 24 . . . as long as . . .[these
activities] are confined to jurisdictions other than the United States."' 0
Both the Institute of Foreign Bankers and the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors contend that securities activities regulations would be more
appropriately considered under amendments to the Glass-Steagall Act. 01
The IBA also explicitly states that for the purposes of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, as amended in 1970, nothing in section 8 would be
construed to define a branch or agency of a foreign bank or a commercial
lending company controlled by a foreign bank as a "bank." 20 This exclu-
sion is somewhat confusing in that foreign bank agencies or commercial
lending companies of a foreign bank had not heretofore been considered
"banks" since neither form "can accept deposits that the depositor has a
legal right to withdraw on demand. ' 2 3 However, where foreign bank
branches had not heretofore been considered "banks" within the meaning
of section 2(c) of the BHCA because they were not "organized under the
laws of the United States," the IBA would provide that federal branches
would be incorporated under the laws of the United States and could
accept deposits tha might be withdrawn on demand. Absent this provision
federal branches would be considered a "bank" under the BHCA. Since
"branch" is inclusive of "federal branch," this provision apparently in-
tends to exclude federal branches. Of course federal agencies would still
be precluded because of their inability to accept deposits.
E. Conclusion
The IBA provides an opportunity for the United States to establish a
national regulatory system which equitably manages foreign banking in-
terests. It includes a number of provisions to facilitate the accomplishment
of its goal of a national treatment of foreign banks. The creation of a dual
Id. Thus, as long as the foreign bank's security affiliate confines itself to countries
outside the United States it can continue its affiliation.
" They contend that section 8 should be deleted from the IBA at least until the Sub-
committee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
completes its current review of the Glass-Steagall Act. Int'l Banking Act of 1977, House
Hearings, supra note 1, at 323, (statement of Conference of State Bank Supervisors). Id. at
521 (statement of the Institute of Foreign Bankers). Apparently, however, this study does not
examine the investment banking problems raised by the IBA. Id. at 215. See also Edwards
& Zwick, Activities and Regulatory Issues: Foreign Banks in the United States, 10 COLUM. J.
WORLD Bus. 58, 66 (1975).
Comm. Print, supra note 2, at 43, § 8(d).
' Edwards, supra note 32, at 246.
19781
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 8:145
system of foreign banking, in effect separating the state and federally
chartered foreign banks, attempts to provide foreign banks with an equal
opportunity to engage in the various facets of banking. The ambiguity of
the deposit taking powers of federal branches, however, needs to be clari-
fied.
The section 8 restrictions on foreign banks' securities activities have met
with much opposition, causing a growing fear of foreign retaliation against
United States banking activities abroad. This provision would be more
properly considered as an amendment to the Glass-Steagall Act.
The relaxation of restrictive citizenship requirements and the attempt
to provide federal deposit insurance for foreign banks are indicative of a
more equitable attitude toward foreign banks. There remains, however, a
considerable gap between the potential effect of the IBA and its stated
purpose of national treatment, as evidenced by the restrictions on the
establishment and multistate branching of federal branches and agencies.
As this gap closes it will become more apparent whether this "separate but
equal" policy toward foreign banks will be effective.
Patrick F. McMahon
As this Note goes to print, several amendments to the IBA were adopted on February 28,
1978, by the full House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. An amendment
by Representative St. Germain (Rhode Island) revised section 5, Interstate Banking Opera-
tions. Using identical wording to the International Banking Act of 1977, this amendment
would subject federal branches and agencies to the same interstate branching restrictions as
national banks. As in the International Banking Act of 1977, this restriction would preclude
interstate branching by foreign banks via federal branches and agencies. State branches,
agencies, and commercial lending companies could be operated outside the foreign bank's
home state only if (1) the statute laws of the 'state in which the branch or agency would be
located expressly authorize such operation and (2) such operation were approved by that
state's regulatory authority. This provision would be somewhat more restrictive than the IBA
in that it would require express statutory authorization in addition to approval by the state's
regulatory authority. However, while existing foreign bank activities outside the home state
would not be terminated, further interstate branching would depend upon express statutory
approval and might require some states to amend their statutes. The proposed amendment,
would reinsert a grandfather clause permitting the continued existence of interstate activities
commenced prior to May 1, 1976.
Representative St. Germain has also proposed an amendment to section 7, Authority of the
Federal Reserve System, in response to which, Representative Brown (Michigan) has offered
a substitute proposal. Representatives St. Germain and Brown both propose that state
branches, agencies, and commercial lending companies, whose parent bank meets the thresh-
old amount of $1 billion in total worldwide consolidated assets may be subjected by the FRB
to the same reserve requirements as federal branches and agencies after consultation with
state bank supervisory authorities. While Representative Brown would add that such require-
ments should be imposed in cooperation with state regulatory authorities, both proposals
would give the FRB sole authority to determine whether these reserve requirements should
be imposed. This provision would be a clear infringement of current state regulatory powers.
Both proposals would also provide that examination reports made by state regulatory authori-
ties should be submitted to the FRB upon request. Additionally, Representative St. Germain
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proposed that subject to the authority of the FRB any limitation or restriction based on
capital stock and surplus and applicable to a state member bank should be applicable to the
state branch, agency, or commercial lending company of a foreign bank. Representative
Brown's substitute proposal was adopted.
Representative Hanley (New York) makes perhaps the most important amendment revis-
ing the IBA. Under Representative Hanley's amendment to section 8, Nonbanking Activities,
the restriction on foreign bank's securities activities in the United States would be deleted.
Because of tremendous opposition to these restrictions and because of the potential for foreign
bank retaliation if these restrictions were enacted, it is doubtful the IBA could be passed
without Representative Hanley's amendment. Representative Grassley (Iowa) also offered an
amendment to revise section 9, Guidelines for Foreign Bank Operations, which would enable
the Secretary of the Treasury to take into account any retaliatory treatment by foreign
governments in response to the IBA.
